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Quality improvement (QI) methods have
been introduced to healthcare to support
the delivery of care that is safe, timely,
effective, efficient, equitable and cost
effective. Of the many QI tools and
methods, the Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA)
cycle is one of the few that focuses on
the crux of change, the translation of
ideas and intentions into action. As such,
the PDSA cycle and the concept of itera-
tive tests of change are central to many
QI approaches, including the model for
improvement,1 lean,2 six sigma3 and total
quality management.4
PDSA provides a structured experimen-
tal learning approach to testing changes.
Previously, concerns have been raised
regarding the fidelity of application of
PDSA method, which may undermine
learning efforts,5 the complexity of its
use in practice5 6 and as to the appropri-
ateness of the PDSA method to address
the significant challenges of healthcare
improvement.7
This article presents our reflections on
the full potential of using PDSA in
healthcare, but in doing so we explore
the inherent complexity and multiple
challenges of executing PDSA well.
Ultimately, we argue that the problem
with PDSA is the oversimplification of
the method as it has been translated into
healthcare and the failure to invest in a
rigorous and tailored application of the
approach.
THE VALUE OF PDSA IN HEALTHCARE
IMPROVEMENT
The purpose of the PDSA method lies in
learning as quickly as possible whether an
intervention works in a particular setting
and to making adjustments accordingly to
increase the chances of delivering and
sustaining the desired improvement. In
contrast to controlled trials, PDSAs
allow new learning to be built in to this
experimental process. If problems are
identified with the original plan, then the
theory can be revised to build on this
learning and a subsequent experiment
conducted to see if it has resolved the
problem, and to identify if any further
problems also need to be addressed. In
the complex social systems of healthcare,
this flexibility and adaptability of PDSA
are important features that support the
adaption of interventions to work in
local settings.
A successful PDSA process does not
equal a successful QI project or pro-
gramme. The intended output of PDSA is
learning and informed action. Successful
application of the PDSA methodology
may enable users to achieve their QI
goals more efficiently or to reach QI
goals they would otherwise not have
achieved. But it is also successful if it
saves wasted effort by revealing QI goals
that cannot be achieved under realistic
constraints or if it identifies new pro-
blems to tackle instead of the originally
identified issue. A well-conducted PDSA
promises learning. But it does not, and
cannot, promise that users will achieve
their desired outcomes.
As PDSA has been translated into
healthcare from industrial settings, an
emphasis has been placed on rapid
small-scale tests of change, often on one,
three and then five patients in ‘ramps’ of
increasing scale, and responsibility dele-
gated to frontline staff and improvement
or quality managers. This pragmatic
approach has been embraced and has
been seen as providing a new freedom
for healthcare staff to lead change and
improvement in local care settings.
However, the process of change rarely
progresses in simple linear ramps.6 8 The
conduct of PDSAs can reveal other
related issues that need to be addressed in
order to achieve the improvement goal.
Such issues may relate to minor changes
to current practices or processes of care,
but can often reveal larger cultural or
organisational issues that need to be
addressed and overcome.
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Recent evaluations have reported on the failure of
the PDSA method to help frontline staff address the
multiple improvement challenges they faced as the
scale of investigation and range of issues they needed
to address increased.7 9 A report evaluating the Safer
Clinical Systems programme in the UK identified ‘the
need for clarity about when improvement approaches
based on PDSA cycles are appropriate and when they
are not’, viewing some challenges as ‘too big and
hairy’ for the PDSA method and beyond the scope of
small-scale tests of change run by local clinical teams.7
We argue that any improvement situation, no matter
how big and hairy, is conducive to application of the
PDSA method. The four stages of PDSA mirror the
scientific experimental method of formulating a
hypothesis, collecting data to test this hypothesis, ana-
lysing and interpreting the results and making infer-
ences to iterate the hypothesis.5 10
Whether improvement initiatives have been planned
at national level to support standardisation of care or
planned over a cup of coffee to solve a minor local
problem, we believe there will always be a role for
PDSA. In moving from planning to implementing a
change in practice, PDSA provides a structure for
experimental learning to know whether a change has
worked or not, and to learn and act upon any new
information as a result.
But it is not a magic bullet. Increasingly complex
problems require increasingly sophisticated application
of the PDSA method, and this is where we believe the
problem with the PDSA method lies.
ITS SIMPLICITY BELIES ITS SOPHISTICATION
One of the main narratives surrounding the use of
PDSA in healthcare is that it is easy, and can be
applied in practice by anyone. At one level this is true,
and the simplicity of the PDSA method and its applic-
ability to many different situations can be viewed as
one of its main strengths. However, this simplicity
also creates some of the greatest challenges to using
PDSA successfully. Users need to understand how to
adapt the use of PDSA to address different problems
and different stages in the lifecycle of each improve-
ment project. This requires an extensive repertoire of
skills and knowledge to be used in conjunction with
the basic PDSA model.
One of the main problems encountered in using
PDSA is the misperception that it can be used as a
standalone method. PDSA needs to be used as part of
a suite of QI methods, the exact nature of which may
be influenced by the broader methodological
approach that is being followed (eg, model for
improvement, lean). An important role of the wider
methodological approach is to conduct investigations
prior to starting the use of PDSA to ensure that the
problem is correctly understood and framed.
Investigations can include process mapping, failure
mode effects analysis, cause and effect analysis,
stakeholder engagement and interviews, data analysis
and review of existing evidence.
A second misperception is that the PDSA is limited
to small-scale tests of change on one, three and five
patients. PDSA is an extremely flexible method that
can be adapted to support the scale up of interven-
tions and used in conjunction with monitoring activ-
ities to support sustainability. But, this flexibility gives
rise to a number of key dimensions that require
careful consideration. For instance, the scope and
scale of change, the amount of preparation prior to
use, rigour of the evaluation, time, expertise, manage-
ment support and funding must be carefully aligned.
Often these needs must be rebalanced over the pro-
ject’s lifecycle. If managed well, these adjustments
enable the use of PDSA to adapt to new learning and
support the design and conduct of ‘tests of change’ as
they increase in scale, and often complexity, to
achieve the desired improvement goal.
Using PDSA as an iterative design framework to
help solve ‘big hairy problems’ or ‘big hairy audacious
goals’11 is, therefore, entirely appropriate. In fact,
developing solutions to large-scale ‘wicked pro-
blems’12 may require ‘an iterative explorative and gen-
erative’13 approach of the sort PDSA provides, in
which ‘knowledge is built through designing’.13 The
key is to understand that this framework will need to
be implemented (and resourced) very differently for
large and complex problems than for smaller and
more ‘tame’ problems. One size does not fit all.
While frontline staff with little training or support
may successfully address some quality problems, the
complexity of many problems demands greater organ-
isational support, with direct involvement of senior
managers to facilitate adequate planning. Projects in
which frontline staff must fend for themselves also
run the risk of insufficient usage of theory and exist-
ing evidence to develop the intervention and a sub-
optimal evaluation.
QUICK (NOT DIRTY) TESTS OF CHANGE
In healthcare, PDSA training often overemphasises the
conceptual simplicity of the framework and underem-
phasises the different ways in which the method can
be adapted to solve increasingly complex problems.
This frequently leads people to leap into PDSA with
insufficient prior investigation and framing of the
problem, to delegate management of the process to
frontline staff who have little influence over broader
systemic concerns that need to be addressed, and to
provide these staff with little support to overcome the
obstacles and barriers they face. The resources, skills
and expertise required to apply PDSA in the real
world are often significantly underestimated, leading
to projects that are destined to fail.
This has led to the impression that PDSA cycles
involve ‘quick and dirty’ tests of change. In the rush
to empower healthcare staff, there is a danger that the
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scientific rigour of the PDSA method is frequently
compromised. A systematic review5 revealed that the
core principles of PDSA are often not executed in
practice, with ‘substantial variability with which they
are designed, executed and reported in the healthcare
literature’.6 A failure to properly execute PDSAs can
undermine learning efforts… ‘if data collection does
not occur frequently enough, if iterative cycles are
few, and if system-level changes are not apparent as a
result of these cycles, the improvement work is less
likely to succeed’.6 While its scientific principles differ
from those of controlled trials, rigour in the applica-
tion of PDSA is still required for PDSA to maximise
the learning obtained from tests of change.
In addition to a lack of fidelity with PDSA guiding
principles, there is the need to ensure that each stage
of the cycle is conducted well. But the frenetic culture
endemic in healthcare organisations can make it diffi-
cult to achieve sustained engagement in the delibera-
tive processes of PDSA.
JUST GET ON WITH IT
While ‘planning paralysis’ can be an issue in health-
care organisations, the more common problem is a
serious underinvestment in the planning phase. The
pervasive cultural compulsion to ‘just get on with it’14
leads many teams to move too quickly from ‘plan’ to
‘do.’ The consequences of skipping this up-front work
can include wasted PDSA cycles or projects that fail
altogether. Table 1 describes some of the key failure
modes for the planning and preplanning (ie, investiga-
tion and problem-framing) steps of the PDSA process.
Why do planning failures present such a challenge
to the successful use of PDSA? It is much more diffi-
cult to correctly execute and learn from a plan that
has not been well thought out. And even perfect exe-
cution cannot ensure success if the plan, itself, is
wrong.
The iterative nature of PDSA enables course correc-
tions, but this feature of the approach is much more
effective if there was a clear and reasoned course in
Table 1 Key failure modes for the investigation/problem framing and plan steps
PDSA stages Key failure modes Potential consequence
Investigation and problem framing
Define the problem; determine its causes/
contributing factors; identify stakeholders; set
the criteria for success
Poor definition of the problem and its causes/
contributing factors1 5 21–25
Time, money and goodwill may be wasted trying to
solve the wrong problem or solve it in the wrong
way
Failure to clearly define the criteria for success and
how performance will be measured5 22 26
A poor match between the design of the
intervention and its intended impact; inability to
assess success during ‘study’ phase
Failure to identify key stakeholders22 27 Important knowledge may be left out of the
planning process
Plan
Design an intervention and data collection
plan; specify how the intervention will be
implemented (Do), evaluated (Study) and
sustained (if successful)
No theory of change/programme theory connecting
the intervention to its intended outcomes28–31
Poorly targeted interventions that may be
inefficient or may fail altogether. Poor buy-in due
to a perceived lack of legitimacy
Planned intervention, implementation plan and
study protocol that are not in proportion to one
another and the problem to be solved22 32 33
Underinvestment leading to projects that do not
achieve their goals or that cannot be proven to
have achieved their goals; Overinvestment leading
to wasted resources
Designing a data collection and analysis plan that
is incapable of providing the required answers26
Impossible to know if the intervention was
effective; excessive PDSA cycles required;
aggravation among frontline staff that the
administrative burden of data collection was
wasted
Not consulting key stakeholders during the
planning stage21 27 34 35
Proceeding with an intervention that is predictably
doomed to fail; disengagement among frontline
staff
Not planning for the ‘who, what, where, when,
and how’ of implementation (the ‘do’
phase)5 22 36
Poor understanding of resource requirements and
cost-effectiveness; poor execution of the ‘do’ and
‘study’ phases
Adopting weak interventions (eg, administrative
controls, such as training and policies) without
considering more robust options37–41
Interventions that do not achieve their goals or do
not sustain them
Not assessing cultural and structural barriers/
facilitators related to the intervention14 21 42–44
‘Fish out of water’ interventions put in place
without attention to the broader changes required
to make them successful; systemic issues not
tackled and only superficial change attempts made
Failure to plan for how the intervention will be
sustained in practice, if successful16 7 38 45 46
Performance reverts to previous standards, staff
frustrated with unsuccessful change effort and
disengage from future attempts
Failure to consider the intervention’s failure modes
and potential side effects (positive and
negative)21 45 47
Interventions that are designed to fail or that
create more problems than they solve; failure to
select the most cost-effective solutions
PDSA, Plan-Do-Study-Act.
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the first place. Many of the barriers to success in the
do, study and act phases can be predicted and miti-
gated through more effective planning.
OVERCOMING THE PREVAILING CULTURE OF ‘DO,
DO, DO’
The structured, reflective practice required for PDSA
runs counter to the main mode of operation in health-
care organisations, ‘doing’, with the time required for
planning and reflection regarded as a luxury rather
than a necessity. As a result, teams often get ‘stuck’ in
the ‘do’ phase, failing to progress to the ‘study’ phase.
While these problems may reflect poor planning, they
may also be caused by problems beyond the control of
the project team, such as the challenges of creating
time to conduct tests of change, staff turnover and
changing or competing priorities. To stop at the ‘do’
phase is to throw away the core contribution of
PDSA: its support for iterative design as a way of
making improvement interventions more successful.15
Another important but frequently overlooked part of
the ‘do’ phase is inductive learning, noticing the unex-
pected and feeding these observations into the study
phase.
Poor planning or conduct of the ‘do’ phase in turn
can significantly undermine the ‘study’ phase. In some
cases, improvement teams appear to bypass the ‘study’
phase altogether, moving directly from ‘do’ to ‘act’.5
In other cases, the ‘study’ phase may collect
insufficient data or may not collect the right type of
data to answer questions about the intervention’s
effectiveness and acceptability. For instance, quantita-
tive data can assess the impact of a given change,
without qualitative feedback; the reasons for the
results or staff attitudes and ideas about what could be
improved will remain unknown. It is also possible that
teams draw the wrong conclusions from the data they
have collected or fail to notice unanticipated conse-
quences, which may lead to incorrect actions.
Failure to take appropriate action based on what
was learned from the ‘study’ phase and previous
PDSA cycles is another common concern.5
Inappropriate actions may include adopting or scaling
up an intervention that has not proven effective and
acceptable,16 or ending a project that has proved suc-
cessful, or is on track to do so. An important part of
the act phase consists of reviewing and revising the
theory of how the intervention is intended to achieve
its desired impact. This iterative refinement of theory
is a key component of PDSA methodology, which is
often overlooked in practice.
Effectively managing the PDSA process is about
more than individual PDSA steps or cycles.
Connecting PDSA cycles together is a messier and far
more complicated endeavour than most of the litera-
ture on the approach suggests.6 Progression across
cycles is seldom linear, and double-loop learning17
may lead to revised goals, as well as revised
Table 2 Key failure modes for executing the do, study and act steps
PDSA stages Key failure modes Potential consequence
Do
Implement the plan (including both the QI
intervention and the data collection plan)
Failure to implement the QI intervention as
intended27 36
Impossible to learn whether the planned QI intervention
works as expected; wasted effort; disillusionment
among staff involved with intervention design
Failure to collect the data as intended27 36 Undercuts the Study phase; may be difficult or
impossible to tell whether the intervention worked as
expected; difficult or impossible to learn about the
effectiveness of the original data collection plan
Failure to capture unanticipated
learning17 22 27
Missed learning opportunities (especially for qualitative
learning about how and why the intervention did/did
not work); project failure; unnecessary PDSA cycles
Failure to abandon the Do phase despite
manifest failure or severe negative side
effects24
Wasted effort; excessive disruption; adverse outcomes
from side effects
Study
Analyse data and compare results to the
definition of success; distil and communicate
what has been learned from the formal data
analysis and unanticipated learning
Failure to conduct a study5 or inappropriate
failure to follow the study plan
No/limited opportunity to learn whether the
intervention works as intended; potential for biased
and misleading results
Failure to communicate what has been
learned27 46
Loss of stakeholder engagement; reinventing the same
broken wheel in the service of other QI projects; loss of
institutional knowledge if there is turnover among
project leaders
Act
Based on what has been learned, either:
1. Revisit the investigation and problem framing
phase
2. Begin a new PDSA cycle at the Plan phase
3. Fully implement and sustain the intervention
or
4. End the project without investing further
effort
Failure to engage in ‘double loop
learning’17 that questions the goals of the
project in light of what has been learned
Wasted effort continuing to work on the wrong
problem, or one that cannot realistically be solved;
Excessive PDSA cycles spent trying to achieve a goal
that is set too high, when a more realistic goal would
deliver real improvement
Moving too quickly from small-scale tests of
change to full-scale implementation and
sustainment5
Failure to uncover barriers to broader use prior to
implementation; project failure; disruption associated
with deimplementation; wasted resources/goodwill
PDSA, Plan-Do-Study-Act; QI, quality improvement.
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interventions, and requires significant oversight to
manage emergent learning and coordination of PDSA
activities over time.
Table 2 describes some of the key failure modes for
the execution of the do, study and act steps of the
PDSA process.
THE PROBLEM WITH PDSA: FAILURE TO INVEST
IN RIGOROUS AND TAILORED APPLICATION
While the PDSA method is conceptually simple,
simple does not mean easy. That said, PDSA is a
powerful approach, and projects that make successful
use of PDSA can solve specific quality problems and
also help shape the culture of healthcare organisations
for the better. So, the effort required to apply PDSA
successfully has a substantial return on investment.
But the resources and supportive context required for
success (including funding, methodological expertise,
buy-in and sustained effort)18 are often underesti-
mated. Inadequate human resources and financial
support doom many projects to fail and also under-
mine organisational culture, contributing to change
fatigue and disillusionment as yet another project pro-
duces no real improvement. It is therefore crucial, at
both the project level and the programmatic level, that
the resource requirements for successful application of
PDSA for a given project are well understood and that
the process is well managed.
The barriers to ensuring this type of practice in a
healthcare culture of ‘just get on with it’ and ‘do, do,
do’ are difficult to overcome. To be successful, the use
of PDSA must be supported by a significant invest-
ment in leadership, expertise and resources for
change.
Academia and researchers have a potential role to
play to support appropriate rigour of planning and
studying and understanding how to manage emergent
learning while engaging diverse stakeholder groups.
Working in partnership will be beneficial to support
effective use of PDSA and is essential to establish
genuine learning organisations.19 20
Twitter Follow Julie Reed at @julie4clahrc and Alan Card at
@AlanJCard
Competing interests None declared.
Disclaimer This article presents independent research
commissioned by the National Institute for Health Research
(NIHR) under the Collaborations for Leadership in Applied
Health Research and Care (CLAHRC) programme for North
West London. The views expressed in this publication are those
of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NHS, the
NIHR or the Department of Health.
Provenance and peer review Commissioned; internally peer
reviewed.
REFERENCES
1 Langley GJ, Moen R, Nolan KM, et al. Changes that result in
improvement. In: The improvement guide: a practical approach
to enhancing organizational performance. 2nd edn.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2009:15–25.
2 Toussaint JS, Berry LL. The promise of lean in health care.
Mayo Clin Proc 2013;88:74–82.
3 Schroeder RG, Linderman K, Liedtke C, et al. Six sigma:
definition and underlying theory. J Oper Manag
2008;26:536–54.
4 Brannan KM. Total quality in health care. Hosp Mater Manage
Q 1998;19:1–8.
5 Taylor MJ, McNicholas C, Nicolay C, et al. Systematic review
of the application of the plan-do-study-act method to improve
quality in healthcare. BMJ Qual Saf 2014;23:290–8.
6 Ogrinc G, Shojania KG. Building knowledge, asking questions.
BMJ Qual Saf 2014;23:265–7.
7 Dixon-Woods M, Martin G, Tarrant C, et al. Safer Clinical
Systems: evaluation findings. London, 2014. http://www.health.
org.uk/sites/default/files/
SaferClinicalSystemsEvaluationFindings_fullversion.pdf
8 Taylor-Adams S, Vincent C. Systems analysis of clinical
incidents: the London protocol. Clin Risk 2004;10:211–20.
9 Benning A, Ghaleb M, Suokas A, et al. Large scale
organisational intervention to improve patient safety in four
UK hospitals: mixed method evaluation. BMJ 2011;342:
d195.
10 Berwick DM. Developing and testing changes in delivery of care:
a cardiologist’s perspective. Ann Intern Med 1998;128:651–6.
11 Nanji KC, Ferris TG, Torchiana DF, et al. Overarching goals:
a strategy for improving healthcare quality and safety? BMJ
Qual Saf 2013;22:187–93.
12 Rittel H, Webber M. Dilemmas in a general theory of
planning. Policy Sci 1973;4:155–69.
13 Sevaldson B. Discussions & movements in design research a
systems approach to practice research in design. Form Akad
2010;3:8–35.
14 Dixon-Woods M. Why is patient safety so hard? A selective
review of ethnographic studies. J Health Serv Res Policy
2010;15:11–16.
15 Padula W V, Duffy MP, Yilmaz T, et al. Integrating systems
engineering practice with health-care delivery. Heal Syst
2014;3:1–11.
16 de Saint Maurice G, Auroy Y, Vincent C, et al. The natural
lifespan of a safety policy: violations and system migration in
anaesthesia. Qual Saf Healthc 2010;19:327–31.
17 Argyris C. Double loop learning in organizations. Harv Bus
Rev 1977;55:115–26.
18 Kaplan HC, Provost LP, Froehle CM, et al. The Model for
Understanding Success in Quality (MUSIQ): building a theory
of context in healthcare quality improvement. BMJ Qual Saf
2012;21:13–20.
19 Marshall M, Pagel C, French C, et al. Moving improvement
research closer to practice: the Researcher-in-Residence model.
BMJ Qual Saf 2014;23:801–5.
20 National Advisory Group on the Safety of Patients in England.
A promise to learn- a commitment to act: Improving the Safety
of Patients in England. London, 2013. https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
226703/Berwick_Report.pdf
21 Batalden P. Making improvement interventions happen—the
work before the work: four leaders speak. BMJ Qual Saf
2014;23:4–7.
22 Card AJ, Ward JR, Clarkson PJ. Rebalancing risk management
—part 1: the Process for Active Risk Control (PARC).
J Healthc Risk Manag 2014;34:21–30.
The problem with…
Reed JE, Card AJ. BMJ Qual Saf 2015;0:1–6. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2015-005076 5
group.bmj.com on January 13, 2016 - Published by http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
23 Dorst K. The core of “design thinking” and its application. Des
Stud 2011;32:521–32.
24 Walley P, Gowland B. Completing the circle: from PD to PDSA.
Int J Health Care Qual Assur 2004;17:349–58.
25 Harvey G, Jas P, Walshe K. Analysing organisational context:
case studies on the contribution of absorptive capacity theory
to understanding inter-organisational variation in performance
improvement. BMJ Qual Saf 2015;24:48–55.
26 Portela MC, Pronovost PJ, Woodcock T, et al. How to study
improvement interventions: a brief overview of possible study
types. BMJ Qual Saf 2015;24:325–36.
27 Platts N, Shepherd S. Managing change in critical care: a
toolkit for practice. Ciritcal Care Outreach 2006:243–68.
28 Davidoff F, Dixon-Woods M, Leviton L, et al. Demystifying
theory and its use in improvement. BMJ Qual Saf
2015;24:228–38.
29 Foy R, Ovretveit J, Shekelle PG, et al. The role of theory in
research to develop and evaluate the implementation of patient
safety practices. BMJ Qual Saf 2011;20:453–9.
30 Dixon-Woods M, Tarrant C, Willars J, et al. How will it work?
A qualitative study of strategic stakeholders’ accounts of a
patient safety initiative. Qual Saf Heal Care 2010;19:74–8.
31 Reed JE, McNicholas C, Woodcock T, et al. Designing quality
improvement initiatives: the action effect method, a structured
approach to identifying and articulating programme theory.
BMJ Qual Saf 2014;23:1040–8.
32 Card AJ, Ward JR, Clarkson PJ. Trust-level risk evaluation and
risk control guidance in the NHS east of England. Risk Anal
2014;34:1471–81.http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/risa.12159
(accessed 17 December 2013).
33 Hillson D. Developing effective risk responses. Proceedings of
the 30th annual project management institute 1999 seminars
& symposium. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, 1999.
34 Mills PD, Neily J, Kinney LM, et al. Effective interventions
and implementation strategies to reduce adverse drug events in
the Veterans Affairs (VA) system. Qual Saf Health Care
2008;17:37–46.
35 Mills PD, Neily J, Luan DD, et al. Using aggregate root cause
analysis to reduce falls and related injuries. Jt Comm J Qual
Patient Saf 2005;31:21–31.
36 Wandersman A, Alia K, Cook B, et al. Integrating
empowerment evaluation and quality improvement to achieve
healthcare improvement outcomes. BMJ Qual Saf
2015;24:645–52.
37 Card AJ, Ward J, Clarkson PJ. Successful risk assessment may
not always lead to successful risk control: a systematic literature
review of risk control after root cause analysis. J Healthc Risk
Manag 2012;31:6–12.
38 Bagian JP. Health care and patient safety: the failure of
traditional approaches—how human factors and ergonomics
can and must help. Hum Factors Ergon Manuf 2012;22:1–6.
39 Card AJ, Simsekler MCE, Clark M, et al. Use of the
Generating Options for Active Risk Control (GO-ARC)
technique can lead to more robust risk control options. Int J
Risk Saf Med 2014;26:199–211.
40 Card AJ, Ward JR, Clarkson PJ. Rebalancing risk management
-part 2: the Active Risk Control (ARC) toolkit. J Healthc Risk
Manag 2015;34:4–17.
41 Card AJ, Ward JR, Clarkson PJ. Generating Options for Active
Risk Control (GO-ARC): introducing a novel technique. J
Healthc Qual 2014;36:32–41.
42 Iedema R, Jorm C, Braithwaite J. Managing the scope and
impact of root cause analysis recommendations. J Heal Organ
Manag 2008;22:569–85.
43 Card AJ. A new tool for hazard analysis and force field
analysis: the lovebug diagram. Clin Risk 2013;19:87–92.
44 Greenhalgh T, Robert G, Macfarlane F, et al. Diffusion of
innovations in service organizations: systematic review and






45 Oyler J, Vinci L, Johnson JK, et al. Teaching internal medicine
residents to sustain their improvement through the quality
assessment and improvement curriculum. J Gen Intern Med
2011;26:221–5.
46 Larson DB, Mickelsen LJ. Project Management for Quality
Improvement in Radiology. Am J Roentgenol 2015;205:
W470–7.
47 Card AJ. The Active Risk Control (ARC) toolkit: a new
approach to designing risk control interventions. J Healthc Risk
Manag 2014;33:5–14.
The problem with…
6 Reed JE, Card AJ. BMJ Qual Saf 2015;0:1–6. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2015-005076
group.bmj.com on January 13, 2016 - Published by http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
The problem with Plan-Do-Study-Act cycles
Julie E Reed and Alan J Card
 published online December 23, 2015BMJ Qual Saf 
 5076
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/early/2015/12/22/bmjqs-2015-00





This article cites 42 articles, 17 of which you can access for free at: 
service
Email alerting
box at the top right corner of the online article. 
Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article. Sign up in the
Collections




To request permissions go to:
http://journals.bmj.com/cgi/reprintform
To order reprints go to:
http://group.bmj.com/subscribe/
To subscribe to BMJ go to:
group.bmj.com on January 13, 2016 - Published by http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
